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Abstract
Co-opting physicians to regulate Fee-for-Service (FFS) payment is more feasible and simpler to administer than 
capitation, Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRGs) and pay-for-performance. The key lies in designing and revising the 
fee schedule, which not only defines and sets the fee for each item, but also the conditions of billing. Adherence to 
these regulations must be strictly audited in order to control volume and costs, and to assure quality. The fee schedule 
requires periodic revisions on an item-by-item basis in order to maintain balance among the providers, to list new 
drugs, devices and equipment, and to reflect the lower market prices of existing ones. Implementing the fee schedule 
will facilitate the control of balance billing and extra billing, and the introduction of more sophisticated methods of 
payment in the future.
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There appears to be a general consensus that Fee-for-Service (FFS) payment is an evil practice leading to overprovision, inefficiency and uncontrollable health 
expenditures (1). The assumption is that FFS encourages 
physicians to deliver more and unnecessary services to 
maximize their income. However, physicians have historically 
been paid FFS and it continues to be the dominant method in 
most countries. Physicians have preferred FFS because they 
would be compensated for delivering the best care to patients 
according to their professional standards. Physicians have 
also claimed that they waive or decrease payment for patients 
unable to pay by providing charity care with the balance met 
by charging rich patients.
This professional model has been criticized as being a facade 
for hiding the self-interest of the physician as an individual 
and as a group (2). There has been heightened awareness of 
the need for equity and transparency, and in many countries, 
the state, and not individual physicians, has assumed the 
primary responsibility for making appropriate care available 
to all. However, the same asymmetry of information that 
exists between the patient and the physician also exists 
between the government and physicians. Therefore, the 
government must co-opt physicians in pursuing their goals. 
They must find a middle ground between what the country 
can afford to spend on health care, and the extent of services 
that health professionals believe they should provide, and, 
equally important, how much their income should be. The 
former depends on the resources available and on how 
much the rich and healthy are prepared to pay for the health 
expenditures of the poor and chronically ill. The latter has 
never been specified, but a common assumption is that 
physicians should earn a “comfortable income”.
In most high-income countries, governments have been able to 
agree with physician associations on the “appropriate” levels of 
services and physicians’ incomes. The most notable exception 
is the United States (U.S), where the task has been mostly 
left to private health insurance plans and providers. This has 
resulted in cost escalations, inequity and high administrative 
costs as each player has tried to game at the expense of others, 
while its health outcomes remain mediocre compared with 
other high-income countries. It also allowed some physicians 
to earn twenty times the income of the average worker (or that 
of a nurse), and for cardiac surgeons to earn three times or 
more the income of general practitioners (GPs). Policy-makers 
in low- and middle-income countries should be aware that 
most alternative models to FFS payment have been designed 
to address the problems peculiar to the American healthcare 
system, based on microeconomic theories that physicians will 
maximize their utility (3). This point is illustrated by the brief 
description below of the development of these methods in the 
U.S and their inherent problems (4).
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) came to be 
promoted from the late 1960s as a way to combine health 
insurance with the actual provision of care. The underlying 
assumption was that providing capitated payment to primary 
care physicians according to the number enrolled would 
contain costs by incentivizing them to improve health status. 
It later developed into numerous complex patterns under 
the general rubric of “managed care”. Therefore, the caveats 
of capitation could be better understood by looking at the 
British National Health Service. While in theory GPs are 
competing for enrolees, in practice, only very few actually 
change their GPs each year. Moreover, popular practices 
cannot accept new enrolees once they have reached the 
maximum allowed per GP. Nor would competition be feasible 
in rural settings. Capitation also leads to long waiting lists for 
hospital specialist services because GPs have little incentive 
to treat time-consuming complicated patients. There is no 
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evidence to support the superiority of capitation over other 
forms of payment (5).
Case-based payment or Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRGs) 
were introduced in 1984 to replace the unregulated FFS 
payment to hospitals for inpatient care (payment to 
physicians has continued to be FFS). DRGs had a one-time 
effect in containing inpatient care costs but those were offset 
by increases in outpatient care and nursing home costs. Other 
countries in Europe introduced DRGs for entirely different 
reasons: to provide incentives to hospitals by replacing 
fixed budgets that had caused long waiting lists. Whether 
the introduction of DRGs had the desired effects is difficult 
to evaluate because they were part of structural reforms to 
improve hospital efficiency (6).
Pay-for-Performance (P4P) gives bonus payment for 
physicians who achieve pre-defined clinical targets. Although 
in theory P4P is an ideal payment mechanism, there is at 
most mixed evidence of their results, and much depends on 
the context (7,8). Critics also voiced concerns about strict 
metrics used to evaluate performance. Keeping cholesterol 
and blood pressure below prescribed targets may be beneficial 
for population health, but not for all patients. Some “process-
driven” P4P indicators, for example prescribing beta-blockers, 
are contra-indicated for some patients (9). Theoretically, 
P4P indicators could be developed based on risk adjusted 
outcomes, but physicians are generally uncomfortable and 
unconvinced with the results of such complicated statistical 
analysis. Methodologically, all P4P indicators must avoid the 
“ceiling effect” (providing additional income to nearly all) and 
the “floor effect” (payment so little as would be disregarded 
by most).
What is common with the above alternative methods of 
payment is that they require more complex mechanisms than 
regulating FFS to ensure they function appropriately. This is 
to some effect inevitable as they were designed for the highly 
sophisticated U.S. healthcare system. Capitation payment 
in primary care may appear attractive, but aside from the 
caveats described, many countries have difficulty in attracting 
physicians to general practice. DRGs and P4P require well-
designed patient identification, classification, recording and 
monitoring systems. In DRGs, measures to mitigate providers 
from up-coding (coding patients to higher paid groups than 
is appropriate) must be made. Monitoring under-provision of 
services is more difficult than overprovision in FFS because, 
for some patients, bed rest and observation may be the 
best treatment.
Moreover, there are fundamental and practical problems 
inherent to the above alternate payment models. The 
incentives target provider organizations, which in turn must 
persuade individual physicians to deliver services more 
efficiently. But physicians have not been trained to take on 
such responsibilities. To them, their professional code to 
provide the best care for the patient takes precedence. There 
are few circumstances in which physicians agree to explicitly 
ration resources in order to maximize societal benefit, for 
example the allocation of transplant organs or the triage of 
patients in an emergency or following a disaster. On the other 
hand, there is a risk that the organization succeeds too well 
in persuading physicians to cooperate and thereby maximize 
profits for both parties.
As a practical problem, FFS will remain the dominant method 
of payment for privately financed healthcare. In particular, for 
physicians who have newly opened offices, FFS would be the 
only feasible option as the transfer of capitation payment from 
existing ones is difficult. Since physicians in many countries 
have dual appointments, they have every incentive to direct 
patients to privately financed facilities (either co-located to 
a public hospital or stand-alone). Patients who are able to 
pay can avoid queues, enjoy better amenities and access to 
perceived high quality care. Thus, as general income levels 
rise, the share of privately financed services is likely to increase 
and so will the disparity. Moreover, private payment is not 
restricted to private facilities: publicly financed facilities may 
continue to charge patients for services not covered (extra-
billing) or to charge more (balance billing), which will defeat 
the purpose of introducing DRGs or capitation. 
I have come to the conclusion that, rather than to regard FFS 
payment as an evil practice, it would be more practical and 
preferable to co-opt physicians into developing a fee schedule 
that defines and sets the fee of each item. It must also define 
the conditions of payment based on the provider’s capacity 
to appropriately deliver the service and on the patient’s 
clinical needs. Imposing and monitoring adherence to these 
regulations can not only mitigate inappropriate volume 
expansion but also assure basic quality standards be met. It 
should also facilitate the control of extra billing and balance 
billing by explicitly setting the terms for billing publicly 
financed services. Moreover, if privately financed facilities 
could be persuaded to adopt the same classification system, 
it would decrease their administrative costs and, in the longer 
term, pave the way for the eventual unification of fees and 
payment conditions with the publicly financed facilities.
Designing the fee schedule is much more of a political, 
rather than an economic, process. Elaborate cost studies 
have little value because the results would only reflect those 
of the facilities studied and become quickly dated. Political 
commitment at the highest level, a core team of dedicated 
bureaucrats to negotiate with stakeholders, design and 
conduct surveys, and process data, and the establishment 
of a high level, statutory defined government committee to 
which renowned physicians would be invited as members 
are needed. The first task would be to ask specialist groups 
to set the relative fee of each procedure by comparing with 
a base. Their results could be bridged by the procedures 
performed by two or more specialties. In doing so, it is critical 
to prevent powerful specialties from skewing the values to 
their advantage, and to ensure that primary care services are 
given high values. Proactive management of conflict among 
and within physicians’ associations would be needed. 
The next task would be to precisely define each item and 
set the conditions for billing. For example, which physician 
consultations are “initial”, and which ones are “repeat”? The 
former requires more time than the latter thus justifying 
a higher fee. Unless there is some specification about the 
number of days since the last visit, physicians can be tempted 
to bill all visits as “initial”. Simple procedures, such as urine 
tests, should be specified and included in the consultation 
fee. Costs could be contained by specifying the extent and 
frequency of laboratory tests appropriate for a disease and by 
degree of severity. On the other hand, conditions could be set 
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for quality purposes such as higher payment for bed and board 
if the hospital has a high nurse staffing ratio (on condition that 
licensure of nurses meets appropriate standards). Compared 
with process and outcome measures in P4P, they would be 
easier to measure and audit. 
The price for prescription drugs, devices and use of equipment 
(such as MRI) depends on the international markets where 
countries can leverage their buying power. For drugs, whether 
the drug is protected by patent or not is crucial because the 
industry has maintained that the high costs of launching a 
new brand drug come from Research and Development (R 
& D), not from its manufacturing. For devices and use of 
equipment, whether the patent is active or not is less important 
because, unlike drugs, improvements are constantly made, so 
that the price of an old model could be rapidly driven down 
by competition. Strict conditions of billing similar to that for 
services must be set in addition to meeting efficacy and safety 
standards evaluated by clinical trials.
Next, to monitor adherence to the conditions of billing, 
there must be a process of auditing the claims (bills) sent by 
providers. This would be of three levels. The first is screening 
by the administrative staff, which would be facilitated by 
electronic billing. The second is in depth reviews by physicians, 
preferably by prestigious clinicians of the same specialty. The 
third is on site audits of the medical records to cross-check 
whether the patient had actually met the conditions of billing 
for the services, drugs and so forth, with penalties for failing 
to provide documentation. Auditing would be easier for FFS 
than for other forms of payment because the government has 
data on the itemized services billed.
Finally, a crucial component in regulating FFS payment 
is devising the method for periodically revising the fee 
schedule. This should be made on an item-by-item basis in 
order to maintain balance among the providers, to list new 
drugs, devices and equipment, to reflect the lower prices paid 
by providers of existing ones, and to remedy any unexpected 
behaviour of providers that has occurred after the previous 
revision (10). If the imbalance is not addressed, physicians 
in some specialties would continue to earn more income 
than others, and exacerbate the existing mal-distribution by 
attracting a disproportional share of medical school graduates. 
The market will not redress this imbalance because physicians 
can induce demand. 
Revisions also play a crucial role in containing costs. While 
the introduction of new technology does drive up costs, 
competition should drive down the price of existing ones 
because healthcare providers would try to purchase them at 
the lowest price. These reductions could be used to mitigate 
increases in health expenditures due to non-price factors: 
demographics (population increase and aging) and advances 
in technology. Should the savings exceed the fiscal space 
available, then service fees must be reduced. The simplest way 
is by decreasing the conversion factor but such an across-the-
board decrease would unite all providers in opposing such 
a revision. This is another reason why revisions should be 
made on an item-by-item basis, which would enable policy-
makers to divide and rule. By weighing the impact of revising 
each item by its volume, and then adjusting their cumulative 
impact on the total expenditures, it is possible to set by a global 
budget despite the seemingly open-ended FFS payment. 
Designing and revising a fee schedule is a daunting task for 
low- and middle-income countries because the disparity 
between the norms set in medical textbooks and the 
resources available is greater than in high-income countries. 
However, FFS should first be regulated before introducing 
more sophisticated methods of payment. This editorial has 
presented a conceptual explanation of how payment has been 
regulated by the fee schedule in Japan. For further details refer 
to the publication listed (11). 
Ethical issues
Not applicable.
Competing interests
Author declares that he has no competing interests.
Author’s contribution
NI is the single author of the manuscript.
References
1. World Health Organization (WHO). Health System Financing. 
Geneva: WHO; 2010. p. 72-5.
2. Marmor TR, Gordon RW. Commercial pressures on 
professionalism in American medical care: From Medicare to the 
Affordable Care Act. J Law Med Ethics 2014; 42: 412-20. doi: 
10.1111/jlme.12164
3. Chinitz D, Rodwin VG. What passes and fails as health policy 
and management. J Health Polit Policy Law 2014; 39: 1113-26. 
doi: 10.1215/03616878-2813719
4. Field RI. Health Care Regulations in America. New York: Oxford 
University Press; 2007. 
5. Gosden T, Forland F, Kristiansen I, Sutton M, Leese B, Giuffrida 
A, et al. Capitation, salary, fee-for-service and mixed systems of 
payment: effects on the behaviour of primary care physicians. 
Cochrane Database Syst Rev 2000; (3): CD002215. doi: 
10.1002/14651858.CD002215 
6. O’Reilly J, Busse R, Hakkinen U, Or Z, Street A, Wiley M. Paying 
for hospital care: the experience with implementing activity-
based funding in five European countries. Health Econ Policy 
Law 2012; 7: 73-101. doi: 10.1017/S1744133111000314
7. Glickman SW, Schulman KA, Peterson ED, Hocker MB, Cairns 
CB. Evidence-based perspectives on pay for performance 
and quality of patient care and outcomes in emergency 
medicine. Ann Emerg Med 2008; 51: 622-31. doi: 10.1016/j.
annemergmed.2008.01.010
8. Greene J. An examination of pay-for-performance in general 
practice in Australia. Health Serv Res 2013; 48: 1415-32.
9. Harzband P, Groopman J. How medical care is being corrupted. 
New York Times [serial on the Internet]. Nov 19, 2014. Available 
from: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/opinion/how-medical-
care-is-being-corrupted.html?_r=0
10. Ikegami N. Games policy makers and providers play: 
Introducing case-mix-based payment to hospital chronic care 
units in Japan. J Health Polit Policy Law 2009; 34: 361-80. doi: 
10.1215/03616878-2009-003
11. Ikegami N. Universal Health Coverage for Inclusive and 
Sustainable Development Lessons from Japan [internet]. 2014; 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/09/20278271/
universal-health-coverage-inclusive-sustainable-development-
lessons-japan
